Göring addresses Luftflotten commanders

At Karinhall Göering says to the commanders of his Luftflotten: "Once the enemy air force has been annihilated our attacks will be directed as ordered against other vital targets." (i.e. targets connected with the invasion.)

"Until further notice the main task of Luftflotten 2 and 3 will be to inflict the utmost damage possible on the enemy's fighter forces."

At the same time he announces that the number of night raids on strategic targets was to be increased.

The Bf 109 units of Luftflotten 3 are ordered to move to new airfields in the Pas-de-Calais to extend their combat radius. (They had previously been based in Normandy and Brittany.)

Because of its heavy losses, the Ju 87 Stuka is to be withdrawn from the battle and, on specific instructions from Göring, fighters are to closely escort the bombers. The Bf 110s also suffered heavy losses and it is even suggested that they should be escorted by the Bf 109.

II./KG 1 bomb Biggin Hill

Yesterday evening the Gruppe was briefed for another daylight raid on Biggin Hill. At 1736 hrs this afternoon we took off and formed up over Calais. We crossed the Channel in close formation, heading directly for the target area. Our fighter escort did an excellent job. They prevented the English fighters from getting anywhere near us, allowing us to lay a carpet of bombs right across the airfield. Despite the heavy flak my navigator, Oberleutnant Heinrich Prinze ze Sayn-Wittgenstein, managed to take several photos of our stick of bombs "walking" across the target. At 2010 hrs we landed back at Rosieères. We had suffered no casualties, just some minor flak damage.

KG1 bomb the Shorts factory at Rochester

On 4 September the Gruppe carried out a daylight raid on the aircraft works at Rochester. Although lasting only 150 minutes (from 1240 hrs until 1510 hrs), it was a tough mission at the target lay at the very limit of our Me 109s' effective escort range.
The Spirfires first attacked from out of the sun, each picking a target before diving away. Some then climbed back up again to make a second attack from below. We were very much reliant on our own collective defensive fire. The few Me 109s that were still hanging on to us could do little. If they became involved in a dogfight they would either be shot down or use up their last remaining fuel and be unable to make it back across the channel.
For us it was most unpleasant to have to watch the English roundels wheeling about at close range right in front of our noses. But we were lucky. The presence alone of our few escorting fighters, however passive their behaviour, seemed to have a deterrent effect and stopped the enemy from mounting a coordinated attack - presumably they were unaware of the Me 109s' problems. Once again we all returned safely to base with nothing but flak damage. But other units were not so fortunate.

"other units" refers to the fighters as the only He 111 casualty was one from 4./KG 26 that was lost over the North Sea.